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Computable randomness is about more than
probabilities
Floris Persiau, Jasper De Bock, and Gert de Cooman
FLip, ELIS, Ghent University, Belgium
Abstract. We introduce a notion of computable randomness for infinite
sequences that generalises the classical version in two important ways.
First, our definition of computable randomness is associated with impre-
cise probability models, in the sense that we consider lower expectations—
or sets of probabilities—instead of classical ‘precise’ probabilities. Sec-
ondly, instead of binary sequences, we consider sequences whose elements
take values in some finite sample space. Interestingly, we find that every
sequence is computably random with respect to at least one lower ex-
pectation, and that lower expectations that are more informative have
fewer computably random sequences. This leads to the intriguing ques-
tion whether every sequence is computably random with respect to a
unique most informative lower expectation. We study this question in
some detail and provide a partial answer.
Keywords: computable randomness · coherent lower expectations · im-
precise probabilities · supermartingales · computability.
1 Introduction
When do we consider an infinite sequence ω = (x1, . . . , xn, . . . ), whose individual
elements xn take values in some finite sample space X, to be random? This is
actually not a fair question, because randomness is never defined absolutely,
but always relative to an uncertainty model. Consider for example an infinite
sequence generated by repeatedly throwing a single fair die and writing down
the number of eyes on each throw. In this case, we would be justified in calling
this sequence random with respect to a precise probability model that assigns
probability 1/6 to every possible outcome.
It is exactly such precise probability models that have received the most
attention in the study of randomness [2,3,9]. Early work focused on binary se-
quences and the law of large numbers that such sequences, and computably se-
lected subsequences, were required to satisfy: an infinite binary sequence of zeros
and ones is called Church random if the relative frequencies in any computably
selected subsequence converge to 1/2 [2]. Schnorr, inspired by the work of Ville,
strengthened this definition by introducing a notion of computable randomness
[9]. On his account, randomness is about betting. The starting point is that a
precise probability model that assigns a (computable) probability p to 1 and 1−p
to 0 can be interpreted as stating that p is a fair price for bet I1(Xi) that yields
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1 when Xi = 1 and 0 when Xi = 0, for every—a priori unknown—value Xi of a
binary sequence ω = (x1, . . . , xn, . . . ) of zeros and ones. Such a sequence is then
considered to be computably random with respect to p if there is no computable
betting strategy for getting rich without bounds along ω without borrowing,
simply by betting according to this fair price. Notably, binary sequences that
are computably random for p = 1/2 are also Church random. So here too, the
relative frequency of any element x ∈ X will converge to a limit frequency along
ω — 1/2 in the binary case for p = 1/2. In fact, this is typically true for any notion
of randomness with respect to a precise probability model.
However, as has been argued extensively [6], there are various random phe-
nomena where this stabilisation is not clearly present, or even clearly absent.
Hence, only adopting precise probability models to define notions of random
sequences is too much of an idealisation. Recently, this issue was addressed
by De Cooman and De Bock for binary sequences by introducing a notion of
computable randomness with respect to probability intervals instead of pre-
cise probability models, whose lower bounds represent supremum acceptable
buying prices, and whose upper bounds represent infimum acceptable selling
prices, again for the bet I1(Xi) that, for every value xi of a binary sequence
ω = (x1, . . . , xn, . . . ), yields 1 if Xi = 1 and 0 otherwise [5].
On this account, relative frequencies must not necessarily converge to a limit
frequency along ω, but may fluctuate within the probability interval.
Here, we generalise the work done by De Cooman and De Bock [5] for binary
sequences, and develop a similar concept for infinite sequences that take values in
more general finite sample spaces. To this end, we consider an even more general
framework for describing uncertainty: we use coherent lower expectations—or
sets of probability mass functions—instead of probability intervals or probabil-
ities. Loosely speaking, we say that an infinite sequence ω = (x1, . . . , xn, . . . )
is computably random with respect to a (forecasting system of) lower expecta-
tion(s), when there is no computable betting strategy for getting rich without
bounds along ω without borrowing and by only engaging in bets whose (upper)
expected profit is non-positive or negative.1
This contribution is structured as follows. We start in Section 2 with a brief
introduction to coherent lower expectations, and explain in particular their con-
nection with probabilities and their interpretation in terms of gambles and bet-
ting. Next, in Section 3, we define a subject’s uncertainty for an infinite sequence
of variables X1, . . . , Xn, . . . by introducing forecasting systems that associate with
every finite sequence (x1, . . . , xn) a coherent lower expectation for the variable
Xn+1. This allows us to introduce corresponding betting strategies to bet on the
infinite sequence of variables along a sequence ω = (x1, . . . , xn, . . . ) in terms of
non-negative (strict) supermartingales. After explaining in Section 4 when such
a non-negative (strict) supermartingale is computable, we extend the existing
notion of computable randomness from precise and interval probability models
to coherent lower expectations in Section 5, and study its properties. The re-
1 A real number x ∈ R is called positive if x > 0, non-negative if x ≥ 0, negative if
x < 0 and non-positive if x ≤ 0.
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mainder of the paper focuses on special cases. When we restrict our attention to
stationary forecasting systems that forecast a single coherent lower expectation
in Section 6, it turns out that every sequence ω is computably random with
respect to at least one coherent lower expectation and that if ω is computably
random for some coherent lower expectation, then it is also computably random
for any coherent lower expectation that is less informative, i.e., provides fewer
gambles. This makes us question whether there is a unique most informative
coherent lower expectation for which ω is computably random. After inspect-
ing some examples, it turns out that such a most informative coherent lower
expectation sometimes exists, but sometimes does not. When it does not, our
examples lead us to conjecture that it ‘almost’ exists. We conclude the discussion
in Section 7 by introducing a derived notion of computable randomness with re-
spect to a gamble f and an interval I by focusing on the behaviour of coherent
lower expectations on a specific gamble f of their domain. It turns out that for
every gamble f , a sequence ω is ‘almost’ computably random with respect to
some smallest interval.
2 Coherent lower expectations
To get the discussion started, we consider a single uncertain variable X that takes
values in some finite set X, called the sample space. A subject’s uncertainty about
the unknown value of X can then be modelled in several ways. We will do so
by means of a coherent lower expectation: a functional that associates a real
number with every gamble, where a gamble f : X → R is a map from the sample
space X to the real numbers. We denote the linear space of all gambles by L(X).
Definition 1. A coherent lower expectation E : L(X) → R is a real-valued func-
tional on L(X) that satisfies the following axioms. For all gambles f , g ∈ L(X)
and all non-negative α ∈ R:
C1. min f ≤ E( f ) [boundedness]
C2. E(α f ) = αE( f ) [non-negative homogeneity]
C3. E( f ) + E(g) ≤ E( f + g) [superadditivity]
We will use E to denote the set of all coherent lower expectations on L(X).
As a limit case, for any probability mass function p on X, it is easy to
check that the linear expectation Ep, defined by Ep( f ) ≔
∑
x∈X f (x)p(x) for all
f ∈ L(X), is a coherent lower expectation, which corresponds to a maximally
informative or least conservative model for a subject’s uncertainty. More gener-
ally, a coherent lower expectation E can be interpreted as a lower envelope of
such linear expectations. That is, there is always a (closed and convex) set M of
probability mass functions such that E( f ) = min{Ep( f ) : p ∈ M} for all f ∈ L(X)
[11]. In that sense, coherent lower expectations can be regarded as a generalisa-
tion of probabilities to (closed and convex) sets of probabilities. Alternatively,
the lower expectation E( f ) can be interpreted directly as a subject’s supremum
buying price for the uncertain reward f .
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The particular interpretation that is adopted is not important for what we
intend to do here. For our purposes, the only thing we will assume is that when
a subject specifies a coherent lower expectation, every gamble f ∈ L(X) such
that E( f ) > 0 is desirable to him (in the sense that he is interested in it) and
every gamble f ∈ L(X) such that E( f ) ≥ 0 is acceptable to him (in the sense
that he is not opposed to it). This makes sense under both of the aforemen-
tioned interpretations. Furthermore, as we will see in Section 5, the distinction
between desirable and acceptable gambles does not matter for our definition of
computable randomness. For now, however, we proceed with both notions.
Whenever a subject specifies a coherent lower expectation, we can consider
an opponent that takes this subject up on a gamble f on the unknown outcome
X in a betting game. Borrowing terminology from the field of game-theoretic
probabilities [10], we will refer to our subject as Forecaster and to his opponent
as Sceptic. Forecaster will only bet according to those gambles f ∈ L(X) that
are desirable or acceptable to him, i.e., if E( f ) ≥ 0 (E( f ) > 0). This leads to an
unknown reward f (X) for Forecaster and an unknown reward − f (X) for Sceptic.
After Sceptic selects such a gamble, the outcome x ∈ X is revealed, Forecaster
receives the (possibly negative) reward f (x), and Sceptic receives the reward
− f (x). Equivalently, when considering for any coherent lower expectation E the
conjugate upper expectation E , defined as E( f ) ≔ −E(− f ) for all f ∈ L(X),
then Sceptic is allowed to bet according to any gamble f ∈ L(X) for which
E( f ) ≤ 0 (or E( f ) < 0), leading to an uncertain reward f (X) for Sceptic and an
uncertain reward − f (X) for Forecaster. In what follows, we will typically take
the perspective of Sceptic. The gambles that are available to her will thus be the
gambles f ∈ L(X) with non-positive (or negative) upper expectation E( f ) ≤ 0
(E( f ) < 0).
An important special case is the so-called vacuous coherent lower expecta-
tion Ev, defined by Ev( f ) ≔ min f for all f ∈ L(X). If Forecaster specifies Ev, this
corresponds to a very conservative attitude where he is only interested in gam-
bles f that give him a guaranteed non-negative (or positive) gain, i.e., min f ≥ 0
(min f > 0), implying that Sceptic has a guaranteed non-negative (or positive)
loss, i.e., max f ≤ 0 (max f < 0).
3 Forecasting systems and betting strategies
We now consider a sequential version of the betting game in Section 2 between
Forecaster and Sceptic, by considering a sequence of variables X1, . . . , Xn, . . . , all
of which take values in our finite sample space X.
On each round of the game, indexed by n ∈ N0 ≔ N ∪ {0}, the a priori
unknown finite sequence of outcomes x1:n = (x1, . . . , xn) has been revealed and
we assume that Forecaster’s uncertainty about the next—as yet unknown—
outcome Xn+1 ∈ X is described by a coherent lower expectation. Hence, on each
round of the game, Forecaster’s uncertainty can depend on and be indexed by
the past states.
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All finite sequences s = (x1:n) = (x1, . . . , xn)—so-called situations—are col-
lected in the set S ≔ X∗ =
⋃
n∈N0 X
n. By convention, we call the empty sequence
the initial situation and denote it by . The finite sequences s ∈ S form an
event tree, and it is on this whole event tree that we will describe Forecaster’s
uncertainty, using a so-called forecasting system.
Definition 2. A forecasting system E• : S → E is a map that associates with
every situation s ∈ S a coherent lower expectation E s ∈ E. The collection of all
forecasting systems is denoted by E
•
.
Every forecasting system corresponds to a collection of bets that are available
to Sceptic. That is, in every situation s = (x1, . . . , xn), Sceptic is allowed to bet
on the unknown outcome Xn+1 according to any gamble f ∈ L(X) such that
E s( f ) ≤ 0 (or E s( f ) < 0). This leads to an uncertain reward f (Xn+1) for Sceptic
and an uncertain reward − f (Xn+1) for Forecaster. Afterwards, when the outcome
xn+1 is revealed, Sceptic gets the amount f (xn+1), Forecaster gets the amount
− f (xn+1) and we move to the next round. To formalise this sequential betting
game, we introduce the notion of a supermartingale, which is a special case of a
so-called real process.
A real process F : S → R is a map that associates with every situation s =
(x1:n) ∈ S of the event tree, a real number F(s). With every real process F there
corresponds a process difference ∆F that associates with every situation s ∈ S a
gamble ∆F(s) on X, defined as ∆F(s)(x) ≔ F(sx)−F(s) for every s ∈ S and x ∈ X,
where sx denotes the concatenation of s and x. We call a real process M a (strict)
supermartingale if E s(∆M(s)) ≤ 0 (E s(∆M(s)) < 0) for every situation s ∈ S. Note
that a supermartingale is always defined relative to a forecasting system E•.
Similarly, a real process M is called a (strict) submartingale if E s(∆M(s)) ≥
0 (E s(∆M(s)) > 0) for every s ∈ S. Due to the conjugacy relation between
upper and lower expectations, M is a (strict) supermartingale if and only if
−M is a (strict) submartingale. We collect the super- and submartingales in the
sets M(E•) and M(E•), respectively. A supermartingale M is called non-negative
(positive) if M(s) ≥ 0 (M(s) > 0) for all s ∈ S.
From the previous discussion, it is clear that Sceptic’s allowable betting
behaviour corresponds to supermartingales or strict supermartingales, depend-
ing on whether we consider acceptable or desirable gambles, respectively. In-
deed, in each situation s = (x1:n) ∈ S, she can only select a gamble ∆M(s) for
which E s(∆M(s)) ≤ 0 (E s(∆M(s)) < 0) and her accumulated capital M(x1:n) =
M() +
∑n−1
k=0 ∆M(x1:k )(xk+1), with M() being her initial capital, will therefore
evolve as a (strict) supermartingale. As mentioned before, it will turn out not to
matter whether we consider acceptable or desirable gambles, or equivalently, su-
permartingales or strict supermartingales. To be able to explain why that is, we
will proceed with both. In particular, we will restrict Sceptic’s allowed betting
strategies to non-negative (strict) supermartingales, where the non-negativity
is imposed to prevent her from borrowing money. Non-negative supermartin-
gales M that start with unit capital M() are called test supermartingales.
In what follows, we will use Sceptic’s allowed betting strategies—so non-
negative (strict) supermartingales—to introduce a notion of computable ran-
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domness with respect to a forecasting system. That is, for every forecasting
system E• and every infinite sequence ω ≔ (x1, . . . , xn, . . . )—also called a path in
the event tree—we will define what it means for the path ω to be computably
random with respect to E•. We will denote the set of all paths by Ω ≔ X
N.
However, not all betting strategies within the uncountable infinite set of
all allowed betting strategies are implementable. We will therefore restrict our
attention to those betting strategies that are computable, as an idealisation of
the ones that can be practically implemented.
4 A brief introduction to computability
Computability deals with the ability to compute mathematical objects in an
effective manner, which means that they can be approximated to arbitrary pre-
cision in a finite number of steps. In order to formalise this notion, computability
theory uses so-called recursive functions as its basic building blocks [7,8].
A function φ : N0 → N0 is recursive if it can be computed by a Turing
machine, which is a mathematical model of computation that defines an abstract
machine. By the Church–Turing thesis, this is equivalent to the existence of an
algorithm that, upon the input of a natural number n ∈ N0, outputs the natural
number φ(n). The domain N0 can also be replaced by any other countable set,
which for example allows us to consider recursive functions from N0 ×N0 → N0.
The set of all recursive functions is countable, because the set of all algorithms,
which are finite sequences of computer-implementable instructions, is countable.
We can now develop corresponding notions for recursive sequences of ratio-
nals, computable reals, computable sequences of reals and, finally, computable
real processes such as non-negative supermartingales. A sequence rn of rational
numbers, with n ∈ N0, is called recursive if there are three recursive maps a, b, σ
from N0 to N0 such that b(n) , 0 for all n ∈ N0 and rn = (−1)
σ(n) a(n)
b(n)
for all
n ∈ N0. We say that a sequence rn of rational numbers converges effectively to
a real number x ∈ R if |rn − x | ≤ 2
−N for all n, N ∈ N0 such that n ≥ N. A real
number x is then called computable if there is a recursive sequence rn of rationals
that converges effectively to x. Of course, every rational number is a computable
real. A gamble f : X → R and a probability mass function p : X → [0, 1] are
computable if f (x) or p(x) is computable for every x ∈ X, respectively. After all,
finitely many algorithms can be combined into one.
However, a sequence of real numbers xm, m ∈ N0, may not be computable,
even if each of its individual elements is, because there may be no way to combine
the corresponding infinite sequence of algorithms into one joint finite algorithm.
To formally define a computable sequence of reals, we first introduce a recursive
double sequence of rationals. A double sequence of rationals rm,n, with m, n ∈ N0
is called recursive if there are three recursive maps a, b, σ from N0×N0 → N0 such
that b(m, n) , 0 for every m, n ∈ N0 and rm,n = (−1)
σ(m,n) a(m,n)
b(m,n)
for all m, n ∈ N0.
We say that a double sequence rm,n of rational numbers converges effectively to
a sequence of real numbers xm if |rm,n − xm | ≤ 2
−N for all m, n, N ∈ N0 such that
n ≥ N. A sequence of reals xm is then called computable if there is a recursive
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double sequence rm,n of rationals that converges effectively to xm. Of course,
every recursive sequence of rationals is also a computable sequence of reals.
Anyhow, we are actually looking for a notion of computable real processes
F : S → R to specify Sceptic’s betting behaviour. Conveniently, there are com-
putable bijections θ from the set of all situations S to the naturals N0, whose in-
verse is also computable. This allows us to identify a real process with a sequence
of reals. In particular, if we identify our finite sample space X with the ordered
set {1, 2, . . . ,K}, with K ≔ |X|, then the situations s = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ S can be re-
garded as a bijective base-K numeration of the naturals by defining θ() ≔ 0 and
θ(x1, . . . , xn) ≔
∑n
k=1 xkK
k−1 for every n ∈ N and s = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ S. A rational
process F : S→ Q is then called recursive if there are three recursive maps a, b, σ
from N0 to N0 such that b(θ(s)) , 0 for all s ∈ S and F(s) = (−1)
σ(θ(s)) a(θ(s))
b(θ(s))
for
all s ∈ S. A real process F : s → R is computable if there is a recursive net of
rational numbers rm,n such that |rθ(s),n − F(s)| ≤ 2
−N for all s ∈ S and n, N ∈ N0
such that n ≥ N. In what follows, we will ease the notation by simply writing s
instead of θ(s) as it should be clear from the context what we are referring to.
Observe also that it follows from the definition(s) of computability that for any
computable real process F and any s ∈ S, F(s) is a computable real number.
Furthermore, obviously, a constant real process is computable if and only if its
constant value is.
To end this section, we would like to draw attention to the fact that the
set of all real processes is uncountable, while the set of all computable real
processes is countable, simply because the set of all algorithms is countable. In
the remainder, we will denote by MC(E•) the set of all computable non-negative
supermartingales for the forecasting system E•.
5 Computable randomness for forecasting systems
At this point, it should be clear how Forecaster’s uncertainty about a sequence
of variables X1, . . . , Xn, . . . can be represented by a forecasting system E•, and
that such a forecasting system gives rise to a set of betting strategies whose
corresponding capital processes are non-negative (strict) supermartingales. We
will however not allow Sceptic to select any such betting strategy, but will re-
quire that her betting strategies should be effectively implementable by requiring
that the corresponding non-negative (strict) supermartingales are computable.
In this way, we restrict Sceptic’s betting strategies to a countably infinite set.
We will now use these strategies to define a notion of computable randomness
with respect to a forecasting system E•. The definition uses supermartingales
rather than strict supermartingales, but as we will see shortly, this makes no dif-
ference. Loosely speaking, we call a path ω computably random for E• if there is
no corresponding computable betting strategy M that allows Sceptic to become
rich without bounds along ω, i.e., supn∈N M(ω
n) = +∞, without borrowing.
Definition 3. A path ω is computably random for a forecasting system E• if
there is no computable non-negative real supermartingale M ∈ MC(E•) that is
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unbounded on ω. We denote the collection of all forecasting systems for which ω
is computably random by E
•C
(ω).
It turns out that our definition is reasonable robust with respect to the
particular types of supermartingales that are considered.
Proposition 4. A path ω is computably random for a forecasting system E•
if and only if there is no recursive positive rational strict test supermartingale
M ∈ MC(E•) such that limn→∞ M(ωn) = +∞.
As a consequence, whenever we restrict Sceptic’s allowed betting strategies to
a set that is smaller than the one in Definition 3, but larger than the one in
Proposition 4, we obtain a definition for computably random sequences that is
equivalent to Definition 3. Consequently, it indeed does not matter whether we
restrict Sceptic’s allowed betting strategies to supermartingales or strict super-
martingales.
If we consider binary sequences and restrict Sceptic’s betting behaviour to
non-negative computable test supermartingales, our definition of computable
randomness coincides with the one that was recently introduced by De Cooman
and De Bock for binary sequences [5]. The equivalence is not immediate though
because the forecasting systems in Reference [5] specify probability intervals
rather than coherent lower expectations. Nevertheless, it does hold because in
the binary case, for every coherent lower expectation, the corresponding closed
convex set of probability mass functions on X = {0, 1}—see Section 2—is com-
pletely characterised by the associated probability interval for the outcome 1.
Furthermore, in the case of binary sequences and stationary, precise, computable
forecasting systems, it can also be shown that our definition of computable ran-
domness coincides with the classical notion of computable randomness [9].
Next, we inspect some properties of computably random sequences ω and
the set of forecasting systems E
•C
(ω) for which ω is computably random. We
start by establishing that for every forecasting system E•, there is at least one
path ω ∈ Ω that is computably random for E•.
Proposition 5. For every forecasting system E•, there is at least one path ω
such that E• ∈ E•C(ω).
Consider now the vacuous forecasting system E•,v defined by E s,v ≔ Ev for every
s ∈ S. Our next result shows that the set of forecasting systems E
•C
(ω) for which
ω is computably random is always non-empty, as it is guaranteed to contain this
vacuous forecasting system.
Proposition 6. All paths are computably random for the vacuous forecasting
system: E•,v ∈ E•C(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω.
Furthermore, if a path ω is computably random for a forecasting system E•,
then it is also computably random for every forecasting system that is more
conservative.
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Proposition 7. If ω is computably random for a forecasting system E•, i.e., if
E• ∈ E•C(ω), then ω is also computably random for any forecasting system E
′
•
for which E ′• ≤ E•, meaning that E
′
s( f ) ≤ E s( f ) for all situations s ∈ S and
gambles f ∈ L(X).
The following result establishes an abstract generalisation of frequency stabil-
isation, on which early notions of randomness—like Church randomness—were
focused [2]. It states that if we systematically buy a gamble f for its coher-
ent lower expectation E( f ), then in the long run we will not lose any money.
The connection with frequency stabilisation will become apparent further on in
Section 6, where we present an intuitive corollary that deals with running av-
erages of a gamble f along the infinite sequence ω and its computable infinite
subsequences.
Theorem 8. Consider a computable gamble f , a forecasting system E• for
which E•( f ) is a computable real process, a path ω = (x1, . . . , xn, . . . ) ∈ Ω that is
computably random for this E•, and a recursive selection process S : S → {0, 1}
for which limn→+∞
∑n
k=0 S(x1, . . . , xn) = +∞. Then
lim inf
n→+∞
∑n−1
k=0 S(x1:k)
[
f (xk+1) − E (x1:k )( f )
]
∑n−1
k=0 S(x1:k)
≥ 0.
6 Computable randomness for lower expectations
We now introduce a simplified notion of imprecise computable randomness with
respect to a single coherent lower expectation; a direct generalisation of random-
ness with respect to a probability mass function. We achieve this by simply con-
straining our attention to stationary forecasting systems: forecasting systems E•
that assign the same lower expectation E to each situation s ∈ S. In what fol-
lows, we will call ω computably random for a coherent lower expectation E if
it is computably random with respect to the corresponding stationary forecast-
ing system. We denote the set of all coherent lower expectations for which ω is
computably random by E
C
(ω).
Since computable randomness for a coherent lower expectation is a special
case of computable randomness for forecasting systems, the results we obtained
before carry over to this simplified setting. First, every coherent lower expecta-
tion has at least one random path.
Corollary 9. For every coherent lower expectation E, there is at least one
path ω such that E ∈ E
C
(ω).
Secondly, E
C
(ω) is non-empty as every path ω is computably random for the
vacuous coherent lower expectation Ev.
Corollary 10. All paths are computably random for the vacuous coherent lower
expectation: Ev ∈ EC(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω.
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Thirdly, if a path ω is computably random for a coherent lower expectation
E ∈ E
C
(ω), then it is also computably random for any coherent lower expectation
E ′ that is more conservative.
Corollary 11. If ω is computably random for a coherent lower expectation E,
then it is also computably random for any coherent lower expectation E ′ for
which E ′ ≤ E, meaning that E ′( f ) ≤ E( f ) for every gamble f ∈ L(X).
And finally, for stationary forecasting systems, Theorem 8 turns into a property
about running averages. In particular, it provides bounds on the limit inferior
and superior of the running average of a gamble f along the infinite sequence ω
and its computable infinite subsequences. Please note that unlike in Theorem 8,
we need not impose computability on the gamble f nor on the real number E( f ).
Corollary 12. Consider a path ω = (x1, . . . , xn, . . . ) ∈ Ω, a stationary forecast-
ing system E ∈ E
C
(ω), a gamble f and a recursive selection process S for which
limn→+∞
∑n
k=0 S(x1, . . . , xk ) = +∞. Then
E( f ) ≤ lim inf
n→+∞
∑n−1
k=0 S(x1:k) f (xk+1)∑n−1
k=0 S(x1:k)
≤ lim sup
n→+∞
∑n−1
k=0 S(x1:k) f (xk+1)∑n−1
k=0 S(x1:k)
≤ E( f ).
Notice that especially Theorem 8 transforms into a more intuitive result in this
simplified setting.
When comparing our notion of imprecise computable randomness with the
classical precise one, there is a striking difference. In the precise case, for a given
path ω, there may be no probability mass function p for which ω is random (for
example, if the running frequencies do not converge). But, if there is such a p,
then it must be unique (because a running frequency cannot converge to two
different numbers). In the imprecise case, however, according to Corollary 10
and 11, every path ω is computably random for the vacuous coherent lower
expectation, and if it is computably random for a coherent lower expectation E ,
it is also computably random for any coherent lower expectation E ′ that is more
conservative—or less informative—than E . This leads us to wonder whether
for every path ω, there is a least conservative—or most informative—coherent
lower expectation E
ω
such that ω is computably random for every coherent lower
expectation E that is more conservative than or equal to E
ω
, but not for any
other. Clearly, if such a least conservative lower expectation exists, it must be
given by
E
ω
( f ) ≔ sup{E( f ) : E ∈ E
C
(ω)} for all f ∈ L(X),
which is the supremum value of E( f ) over all coherent lower expectations E
for which ω is computably random. The crucial question is whether this E
ω
is
coherent (C1 and C2 are immediate, but C3 is not) and whether ω is random
with respect to E
ω
. If the answer to both questions is yes, then E
ω
is the least
conservative coherent lower expectation for which ω is random.
The following example illustrates that there are paths ω for which this is
indeed the case. It also serves as a nice illustration of some of the results we
have obtained so far.
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Example 13. Consider a path ω that is computably random for the non-stationary
precise forecasting system E•, defined by E s ≔ Epn mod M for all n ∈ N0 and
s ∈ (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ S, with {p0, . . . , pM−1} a set of pairwise different computable
probability mass functions; it follows from Proposition 5 that such a path exists.
Then as we are about to show, ω is computably random for a coherent lower
expectation E ′ if and only if E ′ ≤ E , with E( f ) ≔ min{Ep0 ( f ), . . . , EpM−1 ( f )} for
every gamble f ∈ L(X).
The ‘if’-part follows by recalling Proposition 7 and noticing that for all s =
(x1:n) ∈ S and all f ∈ L(X):
E ′( f ) ≤ E( f ) = min{Ep0 ( f ), . . . , EpM−1 ( f )} ≤ Epn mod M( f ) = E s( f ).
For the ‘only if’-part, consider for every i ∈ {0, . . . , M − 1} the selection
process Si : S → {0, 1} that takes the value Si(x1:n) = 1 whenever n mod M = i
and Si(x1:n) = 0 elsewhere. Clearly, these selection processes are recursive and
limn→∞
∑n
k=0 S(x1, . . . , xn) = +∞ along the path ω = (x1, . . . , xn, . . . )—and any
other path, in fact. Furthermore, due to the computability of the probability
mass functions pi, it follows that E•( f ) is a computable real process for any
computable gamble f ∈ L(X). For any computable gamble f ∈ L(X), it therefore
follows that
E ′( f ) ≤ lim inf
n→∞
n−1∑
k=0
f (xi+kM )
n
≤ lim sup
n→∞
n−1∑
k=0
f (xi+kM )
n
≤ Epi ( f ),
where the first and third inequality follow from Corollary 12 and Theorem 8,
respectively, and the second inequality is a standard property of limits inferior
and superior. Since (coherent lower) expectations are continuous with respect
to uniform convergence [11], and since every gamble on a finite set X can be
uniformly approximated by computable gambles on X, the same result holds
for non-computable gambles as well. Hence, for any gamble f ∈ L(X) we find
that E ′( f ) ≤ Epi ( f ). As this is true for every i ∈ {0, . . . , M − 1}, it follows that
E ′( f ) ≤ E( f ) for all f ∈ L(X).
Hence, ω is indeed computably random for E ′ if and only if E ′ ≤ E . Since
E is clearly coherent itself, this also implies that ω is computably random with
respect to E and—therefore— that E
ω
= E . So for this particular path ω, E
ω
= E
is the least conservative coherent lower expectation for which ω is random. ♦
However, unfortunately, there are also paths for which this is not the case.
Indeed, as illustrated in Reference [5], there is a binary path ω—so with X =
{0, 1}— that is not computably random for E
ω
with E
ω
( f ) ≔ 1
2
∑
x∈{0,1} f (x) for
every gamble f ∈ L(X).
Interestingly, however, in the binary case, it has also been shown that while
ω may not be random with respect to E
ω
, there are always coherent lower
expectations E that are infinitely close to E
ω
and that do make ω random [5].2
2 This result was established in terms of probability intervals; we paraphrase it in
terms of coherent lower expectations, using our terminology and notation.
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So one could say that ω is ‘almost’ random with respect to E
ω
. Whether a similar
result continuous to hold in our more general—not necessarily binary—context
is an open problem. We conjecture that the answer is yes.
Proving this conjecture is beyond the scope of the present contribution though.
Instead, we will establish a similar result for expectation intervals.
7 Computable randomness for expectation intervals
As a final specialisation of our notion of computable randomness, we now focus
on a single gamble f on X and on expectation intervals I = [E( f ), E( f )] that
correspond to lower expectations for which ω is random. We will denote the set
of all closed intervals I ⊆ [min f ,max f ] by If .
Definition 14. A path ω is computably random for a gamble f ∈ L(X) and
a closed interval I if there is a coherent lower expectation E ∈ E
C
(ω) for which
E( f ) = min I and E( f ) = max I. For every gamble f ∈ L(X), we denote the set
of all closed intervals for which ω is computably random by If (ω).
Note that if ω is computably random for a gamble f and a closed interval I, it
must be that I ∈ If ; so If (ω) ⊆ If . This follows directly from C1 and conjugacy.
We can also prove various properties similar to the ones in Section 5 and 6. The
following result is basically a specialisation of Corollaries 9-11.
Proposition 15. Consider any gamble f ∈ L(X). Then
(i) for every I ∈ If , there is at least one ω ∈ Ω for which I ∈ If (ω);
(ii) for every ω ∈ Ω, If (ω) is non-empty because [min f ,max f ] ∈ If (ω);
(iii) for every ω ∈ Ω, if I ∈ If (ω) and I ⊆ I
′ ∈ If , then also I
′ ∈ If (ω).
Moreover, as an immediate consequence of Corollary 12, if ω is computably
random for a gamble f and a closed interval I ∈ If , then the limit inferior and
limit superior of the running averages of the gamble f along the path ω and its
computable infinite subsequences, lie within the interval I.
The properties in Proposition 15 lead to a similar question as the one we
raised in Section 6, but now for intervals instead of lower expectations. Is there,
for every path ω and every gamble f ∈ L(X), a smallest interval such that ω is
computably random or ‘almost’ computably random for this gamble f and all
intervals that contain this smallest interval, but for no other. The following result
is the key technical step that will allow us to answer this question positively. It
establishes that when ω is computably random for a gamble f and two intervals
I1 and I2, then it is also computably random for their intersection.
Proposition 16. For any ω ∈ Ω and f ∈ L(X) and for any two closed intervals
I and I ′ in If : if I ∈ If (ω) and I
′ ∈ If (ω), then I ∩ I
′
, ∅ and I ∩ I ′ ∈ If (ω).
Together with Proposition 15 and the fact that If (ω) is always non-empty,
this result implies that If (ω) is a filter of closed intervals. Since the intersection of
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a filter of closed intervals in a compact space—such as [min f ,max f ]—is always
closed and non-empty [1], it follows that the intersection
⋂
If (ω) of all closed
intervals I for which ω is computably random with respect to I and f , is non-
empty and closed, and is therefore a closed interval itself. Recalling the discussion
in Section 6, it furthermore follows that
⋂
If (ω) = [Eω( f ), Eω( f )]. Similar to
what we saw in Section 6, it may or may not be the case that ω is computably
random for the gamble f and the interval [E
ω
( f ), Eω( f )]; that is, the—possibly
infinite—intersection
⋂
If (ω) may not be an element of If (ω). However, in this
interval case, there is a way to completely characterise the models—in this case
intervals—for which ω is random. To that end, we introduce the following two
subsets of [min f ,max f ]:
L f (ω) ≔ {min I : I ∈ If (ω)} and Uf (ω) ≔ {max I : I ∈ If (ω)}.
Due to Proposition 15(iii), these sets are intervals: on the one hand L f (ω) =
[min f , E
ω
( f )] or L f (ω) = [min f , Eω( f )) and on the other handUf (ω) = [Eω( f ),max f ]
or Uf (ω) = (Eω( f ),max f ]. As our final result shows, these two intervals allow
for a simple characterisation of whether a path ω is computably random for a
gamble f and a closed interval I.
Proposition 17. Consider a path ω, a gamble f ∈ L(X) and a closed interval
I. Then I ∈ If (ω) if and only if min I ∈ L f (ω) and max I ∈ Uf (ω).
So we see that while ω may not be computably random for f and the in-
terval [E
ω
( f ), Eω( f )], it will definitely be ‘almost’ random, in the sense that it
is surely random for f and any interval I ∈ If such that min I < Eω( f ) and
max I > Eω( f ). In order to get some further intuition about this result, we con-
sider an example where L f (ω) and Uf (ω) are closed, and where ω is therefore
computably random for f and [E
ω
( f ), Eω( f )].
Example 18. Consider two probability mass functions p0 and p1, and let the
coherent lower expectation E be defined by E( f ) ≔ min{Ep0 ( f ), Ep1 ( f )} for all
f ∈ L(X). Then, as we have seen in in Example 13, there is a path ω for which E is
the least conservative coherent lower expectation that makes ω random. Clearly,
for any fixed f ∈ L(X), if we let I ≔ [E( f ), E( f )], it follows that
⋂
If (ω) = I ∈
If (ω), and therefore also that L f (ω) = [min f ,min I] and Uf (ω) = [max I,max f ].
Note that in this example, by suitably choosing p0 and p1, I can be any interval
in If , including the extreme cases where I = [min f ,max f ] or I is a singleton. ♦
8 Conclusions and future work
We have introduced a notion of computable randomness with respect to forecast-
ing systems and with respect to related simpler imprecise uncertainty models:
coherent lower expectations and expectation intervals, thereby going beyond the
classical notions that only assume precise probabilities. In contrast with the pre-
cise case, it turned out that every path ω is computably random with respect
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to at least one uncertainty model, and that whenever a path ω is computably
random for a certain uncertainty model, it is also computably random for any
uncertainty model that is more conservative—or less informative. In the case of
computable randomness with respect to expectation intervals, this insight paved
the way to prove that every ω is computably random for a gamble f ∈ L(X)
and an associated filter of closed intervals. Hence, for every gamble f ∈ L(X), ω
is ‘almost’ computably random for a smallest interval. We believe that a similar
result holds for our notion of computable randomness with respect to coherent
lower expectations, i.e., that every path ω is ‘almost’ computably random for a
maximally informative coherent lower expectation. However, for the time being,
we leave this as an open question.
In our future work, we would like to develop imprecise generalisations of other
classical notions of randomness, such as Martin-Lo¨f and Schnorr randomness
[2], and explore whether these satisfy similar properties. We also wonder if it
would be possible to define notions of computable randomness with respect to
uncertainty models that are even more general than coherent lower expectations,
such as choice functions [4]. Finally, we believe that this research can function as
a point of departure for developing completely new types of imprecise learning
methods; we would love to contribute to that development ourselves.
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